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To the Editors:
Max Abrahms’s argument that terrorism rarely works is compelling.1 He is not correct,
however, that terrorist groups that primarily attack civilians never achieve their politi-
cal objectives. The March 2004 Madrid train bombings offer an exception to Abrahms’s
thesis. The terrorist group that carried out the attack sought to compel Spain to with-
draw its troops from Afghanistan and especially Iraq. The result was a partial success,
because Spain did withdraw its forces from Iraq. This case study, developed below,
helps to identify the uncommon conditions under which at least partial terrorist suc-
cess is possible, and the ªndings have implications for counterterrorism policy.
Two additional arguments follow from this case. First, Abrahms’s concentration on
ofªcial foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) is too narrow to capture the emerging
phenomenon of ad hoc terrorist networks that do not have formal afªliation as a cell of
a recognized FTO. Second, his focus on compelling governments to make policy con-
cessions misses an important distinction between the impact of a terrorist attack on a
government and on a country’s citizens. The Madrid attack never compelled the gov-
ernment led by the Popular Party to change policy on Spanish troops in Iraq. Instead it
mobilized voters to elect a new government led by the Socialist Party because, in large
part, this party campaigned on the promise to pull Spanish troops from Iraq.2
To be fair, the strengths of Abrahms’s analysis outweigh its weaknesses. Contrary to
some recent scholarship on terrorism, he convincingly shows that terrorist organiza-
tions rarely achieve their political objectives. Although he is not the only scholar to ar-
gue that terrorism usually fails, he is the ªrst to analyze systematically a large number
of terrorist organizations and campaigns. Further, he clariªes the conditions under
which success can occur: when terrorist groups have limited objectives and, more im-
portant, when their main targets are military and not civilian. His analysis is theory in-
formed, as he adapts correspondent inference theory to explain his observations. His
article also stimulates contemplation, discussion, and new research projects—including
our Madrid case study.
Abrahms asserts that terrorism rarely succeeds in achieving its political objectives,
especially when a terrorist organization primarily targets civilians. To support his the-
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sis, he sensibly forwards historical examples that demonstrate the argument’s plausibil-
ity. All twenty-eight FTOs that he examines meet his expectations. He then turns to
three case studies that match his predictions perfectly, and he explores them in depth to
show how causation unfolded. His research is a shining example of a plausibility
probe. We looked in vain for any acknowledgment that his thesis might be wrong at
least sometimes, however, or that the degree of certainty of his conclusions is not high.
Likewise, we hoped to ªnd a section in which he would encourage scholars to ªnd
cases that challenge his thesis. Finding none, in a brainstorming session we thought of a
case that does not ªt: the Madrid train bombings.
On March 11, 2004, Spain was the site of the most devastating terrorist attack in Eu-
rope since World War II. Ten bombs exploded on three commuter trains full of passen-
gers making the morning trip into Madrid. The attack resulted in 191 deaths and 1,500
wounded.3
Suspicion initially fell on the Basque separatist movement ETA, which had been the
only active terrorist group in Spain. Evidence soon indicated, however, that an Islamic
terrorist organization was responsible for the attack. The reality was that the individu-
als who helped plan, fund, and carry out the attack constituted an ad hoc jihadist net-
work and not a particular terrorist organization.4 A number of these individuals had
ties with high-proªle members of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, but some
were linked to other groups or were unafªliated. Many were homegrown radicals act-
ing on their own rather than being directed by al-Qaida, the Moroccan Group, or any
other organization. Spanish journalists and scholars refer to the ad hoc group that car-
ried out the March 11, 2004, attacks as the 11-M network.
The primary political objective of the perpetrators was to compel Spain to end its
military support for the U.S.-led occupations in Afghanistan and especially Iraq.5 The
terrorists may also have hoped that Spain would be the weakest link in the U.S. coali-
tion in Iraq, whereby its withdrawal would cause other coalition partners to follow.6
The document supporting this latter assertion was posted on an Islamist message board
four months before the 11-M attack, and it contained a rational analysis of politics in
Britain, Poland, and Spain and implications for the jihadist policy agenda. For two rea-
sons, the document’s author sensibly concluded that attacks on the Spanish would be
most effective: public opposition to the war was greatest in Spain, and Spain was
thought to have lower tolerance for casualties than Britain or Poland. Although the
analysis focused on harming Spaniards in Iraq rather than in Europe, it set the stage for
the 11-M network to predict at least some success.
International Security 32:1 186
3. Raj S.Chari, “The 2004 Spanish Election: Terrorism as a Catalyst for Change?” West European
Politics, Vol. 27, No. 5 (November 2004), p. 954.
4. Javier Jordán and Nicola Horsburgh, “Spain and Islamism: Analysis of the Threat and Response
1995–2005,” Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 11, No. 2 (July 2006), pp. 209–229; and Gordon Corera, “The
Legacy of the Madrid Bombings,” BBC News, February 14, 2007.
5. Javier Jordán and Robert Wesley, “The Madrid Attacks: Results of Investigations Two Years
Later,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 5 (March 9, 2006), pp. 1–4.
6. See Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer, “Jihad Strategic Studies: The Alleged Al Qaida Pol-
icy Study Preceding the Madrid Bombings,” Studies in Conºict & Terrorism, Vol. 27, No. 5 (Septem-
ber–October 2004), pp. 368–371.
Translating the terrorists’ desire to compel Spanish troop withdrawal into terms con-
sistent with Abrahms’s analysis, it was a “limited objective” associated with demands
over territory.7 Spain complied partially when it pulled its troops out of Iraq. This re-
sponse does not follow two key predictions of Abrahms’s theory. First, with civilians as
the primary target, the public is expected to interpret the attack in maximalist terms.
This predicted consequence did not occur. A day after the attack, newspapers through-
out Spain conveyed that many people viewed the attack as a result of Spain’s involve-
ment in Iraq war.8 One Elcano poll found that 49 percent of Spaniards believed that
troop withdrawal would make Islamist attacks less likely. This ªnding supports the as-
sertion that a signiªcant segment of the Spanish public correctly saw the limited objec-
tives of the terrorist group.9 Second, Abrahms’s theory predicts that countries whose
citizens are targeted will not make policy concessions. Again it is wrong. In national
elections three days after the attack, voters deªed earlier polls and voted out the gov-
ernment (led by the People’s Party) that supported Spain’s intervention in Iraq. The
surprise winner was the Socialist Party, which during the campaign had called for re-
moving Spanish troops from Iraq. The troops were withdrawn several months later.
Earlier in March the incumbent Popular Party led the polls by 5 percent, and com-
mentators agree that it would have won the election had it not been for the terrorist at-
tack. The opposition Socialist Party, headed by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, won
42.64 percent of the votes compared with 37.64 percent for the Popular Party. With 164
out of 350 seats in the Congress of Deputies, the Socialists were in a position to form a
minority government.10 During the campaign Zapatero had promised to remove
Spanish troops from Iraq by June 30, 2004. Twenty-eight percent of voters said that the
bombings had inºuenced their vote; and when Spanish troops were withdrawn a
month earlier than expected, a strong majority supported the move.11 A methodical
analysis concludes that the Madrid attack and the political atmosphere surrounding it
affected election results by mobilizing about 1,700,000 voters who had not planned to
vote and by discouraging approximately 300,000 voters from voting—leading to a net 4
percent increase in voter turnout. In addition, more than 1 million voters switched their
vote to the Socialist Party.12
Scholars highlight three factors to explain the surprise election outcome, although
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they may disagree on their relative importance. First, the Popular Party continued to
blame ETA even after the leadership learned that an Islamic group was responsible for
the attack. Admitting that Islamists were to blame would have exposed Prime Minister
José María Aznar to the charge that his foreign policy contributed to the terrorist attack.
Segments of the Spanish population sought to punish his party for the apparent decep-
tion. This factor is linked to a highly partisan “framing contest” between the govern-
ment and the opposition, whereby the opposition presented the situation to the public
more effectively than did the government.13 Second, a signiªcant part of the public mis-
trusted the Popular Party even before the Madrid attack. In reaction to several negative
events since the party assumed an absolute majority in 2000, many Spaniards had be-
gun to sense that the party was complacent and arrogant and that its decisionmaking
process lacked transparency.14 Third, when the terrorists effectively signaled devastat-
ing punishment for Spain’s involvement in Iraq, the public’s antiwar views became
more pressing. Previously, many had opposed the war but supported Aznar. Following
the 11-M attack, however, a signiªcant segment was no longer willing to support the
Popular Party and its war policy.
The conºuence of conditions present in the Madrid case is probably quite rare and
possibly unique. There may be additional, less obvious factors, and perhaps sometimes
they carry more causal weight than these three. Although the generalizability of our
ªndings is low, the case does show that Abrahms’s theory is not always right. Further
research is needed to learn more about the reliability of his ªndings. We encourage
scholars to conduct studies with a larger collection of cases as well as to seek out cases
that may be exceptions to the rule. If more exceptions can be found, scholarly under-
standing of variations in outcomes can widen and deepen.
If successful terrorist attacks against civilians are indeed rare like we expect, then the
impact of our ªndings on Abrahms’s four policy implications would not be extensive.
Our ªndings, however, suggest additional policy implications. They derive from the
above-mentioned observation that the 11-M terrorist network probably targeted Spain
because it was the weakest link among European members of the U.S.-led coalition in
Iraq. To the extent that such an analysis inºuenced the terrorists, therefore, several im-
plications follow. First, more such attacks are likely in the future, because even partial
success breeds support for them. Thus at least some terrorist groups will concentrate on
targets where success is believed possible. Second, several relevant elements for coun-
tering terrorism are prescribed. One is that scholars and analysts worried about terror-
ism should conduct parallel analyses that could provide early warning signals for
countries at higher risk for terrorist attacks. Because the terrorists are somewhat more
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likely to succeed in such countries, another recommendation is to give higher priority
to preventing or foiling attacks. If an attack occurs, it should be handled with less parti-
sanship over framing the issue than occurred after the 11-M attack. Finally, because dis-
trust of the government led by the Popular Party contributed to the terrorists’ success,
governments have an interest in building and maintaining the trust of their publics.
—William Rose
New London, Connecticut
—Rysia Murphy
New London, Connecticut
The Author Replies:
I appreciate William Rose and Rysia Murphy’s thoughtful comments on my recent arti-
cle in International Security.1 We agree on two main points: (1) terrorist groups that pri-
marily target civilians fail to coerce their governments into making policy concessions;
and (2) future research is needed to determine if there are any exceptions to the rule.
Rose and Murphy focus on the second point and purport to identify an important out-
lier that “does not ªt” the rule: the March 2004 Madrid train bombings.
The authors claim that the Madrid case undermines my article in two ways. First,
they believe the attack shows that democracies are uniquely vulnerable to coercion be-
cause terrorists can sometimes inºuence policies by scaring the electorate into ousting
the incumbent leader. Speciªcally, they argue that the Madrid attack represents a suc-
cessful case of coercion because it bombed to power the antiwar candidate for prime
minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, who kept his campaign pledge to withdraw
Spanish troops from Iraq. Second, the authors assert that the Madrid case does not con-
form to correspondent inference theory because the Spanish public interpreted the
bombings as evidence of 11-M’s intent to end the occupation, rather than to destroy the
Spanish way of life, making coercion possible. The ªrst claim is weaker than the sec-
ond: the Madrid case is an empirically problematic example of terrorist coercion, but it
helps to delimit the antecedent conditions in which terrorist attacks on civilians might
theoretically be effective.
The Madrid case is an empirically problematic example of terrorist coercion for three
reasons. First, the argument that the 11-M attack coerced Spain into withdrawing from
Iraq is questionable, because Zapatero might have won the election and then altered
Spanish policy even in the absence of the attack. The “surprise” defeat of Prime Minis-
ter José María Aznar was actually not that surprising. In the days preceding the attack,
Aznar held a narrow lead in most surveys, but the differences between the candidates’
voter estimates usually fell within the margin of error.2 Indeed, by early March the gap
Correspondence: Does Terrorism Ever Work? 189
1. Max Abrahms, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work,” International Security, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Fall
2006), pp. 42–78.
2. Ignacio Lago and José Ramón Montero, “The 2004 Election in Spain: Terrorism, Accountability,
and Voting,” Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Vol. 2, No. 1 (July 2006), p. 17.
between the two candidates had closed: some surveys put Aznar ahead by a single
point, while others had Zapatero winning by a razor-thin margin. In their study on the
2004 Spanish election, Ignacio Lago and José Ramón Montero state, “It must be remem-
bered that if the attacks had not taken place, either the PP [Aznar’s Popular Party]
or the PSOE [Zapatero’s Socialist Party] could have won the election: only days before
11-M, the polls pointed to a ‘technical tie.’”3 Furthermore, in the lead-up to the attack,
the majority of Spaniards believed the country needed a “change of government”; a
large percentage of the electorate was undecided; and in Spain undecided voters tend
to vote for left-wing candidates such as Zapatero.4 Postelection returns conªrm that
Aznar did not lose any electoral support after the attack; as expected, the undecided
voters gravitated toward the left-leaning candidates.5 The extent of electoral change or
interelectoral volatility was not atypical for Spanish national elections.6 The claim that
the 11-M attack successfully coerced Spain into withdrawing from Iraq is based on the
counterfactual argument that without the attack, Zapatero would have lost the election,
which is uncertain from the polling data.
Second, Rose and Murphy imply that undecided voters gravitated toward Zapatero
after the attack because it revealed the escalating costs of maintaining troops in Iraq,
but Aznar compromised his electoral viability primarily by blaming the bombings on
ETA. In testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Philip Gordon
stated, “The [Aznar] government appears to have paid more of a price for misleading
the public than for its policy on Iraq.”7 In her study on the 2004 election, Georgina
Blakeley found that “the point, therefore, is not that the bombings affected the general
election, but rather, that the government’s handling of the bombings had such pro-
found consequences.”8 The BBC likewise reported, “It is sometimes wrongly claimed
that the bombings themselves led directly to the defeat of the Conservative government
and its replacement just days later by the Socialists. In fact, it was the perception that
the government was misleading the public about who was responsible that did [the]
most damage.”9 Other foreign outlets, including Spanish television networks and the
French newspaper Le Monde, reached the same conclusion.10 In sum, the dominant in-
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terpretation is that Zapatero’s postattack election gains were due mostly to Aznar’s
mismanagement of the attack—not the Iraqi occupation that elicited it—undermining
the claim that the attack itself bombed Zapatero into power and effectively coerced the
Spanish withdrawal.
Third, it is doubtful that enlarging my sample of terrorist organizations or including
ad hoc groups afªliated with al-Qaida would lend support to the claim that democra-
cies are uniquely vulnerable to terrorist coercion. I agree with Rose and Murphy that
“the Madrid case is probably quite rare and possibly unique” because terrorism histori-
cally shifts the electorate to the right—not the left—thereby empowering hard-liners
who oppose accommodating the perpetrators.11 The most obvious example is in Israel,
but the trend is also evident in the United States, where the mere release of Osama bin
Laden’s videotape the weekend before the 2004 presidential election boosted George W.
Bush’s electoral lead by two percentage points over his comparatively dovish oppo-
nent, John Kerry.12
Rose and Murphy’s stronger claim is that the Madrid case does not conform to corre-
spondent inference theory. They point out that the train bombings targeted Spanish ci-
vilians, and yet the public did not revise its perception that al-Qaida and its afªliates
aimed to achieve the limited policy goal of ending the occupation of Iraq. The Madrid
case suggests that when a target country has strong preexisting beliefs that the terror-
ists are motivated by limited policy objectives, it will not always infer from attacks on
its civilians that the terrorists are driven by ideological or maximalist objectives.
Before the September 11 attacks, most Americans had little knowledge of al-Qaida.
They therefore inferred from the consequences of the terrorist acts that the perpetrators
aimed to harm American society and its values. Similarly, until the September 1999
apartment bombings, the Russian public knew little about the Chechnya campaign and
therefore inferred from them that the Chechens had maximalist objectives. By contrast,
Spanish opinion of al-Qaida’s limited policy objectives was broadly and intensely es-
tablished prior to the train bombings. Before the attack, 90 percent of the public dis-
agreed with Aznar’s position that participating in the Iraq war made Spain safer from
terrorism, an entrenched disconnect highlighted by two of the largest antiwar protests
in history.13 Whereas news of the Chechnya occupation was withheld from the Russian
public until it was targeted in September 1999, Spanish combat deaths in Iraq in Au-
gust, October, and November 2003 were front-page news, reinforcing the perception
that the terrorists aimed to end the occupation rather than Spain’s way of life.14
The Madrid example suggests that, in theory, terrorist attacks on civilians may po-
tentially lead to policy concessions if the target country has extremely ªrm preexisting
beliefs that the enemy is motivated by limited policy objectives. When this is the case,
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attacks—regardless of target selection—will communicate the escalating costs of defy-
ing the terrorists’ limited policy goals, making coercion possible. Future research is still
needed, however, to identify a case of coercion where these antecedent conditions are
present. Such a case would demonstrate not only that the attack(s) on civilians stoked
the public’s preexisting fears of defying the terrorists’ limited policy objectives, but that
these fears actually changed the country’s policy. Rose and Murphy’s case study on the
11-M attack provides convincing evidence of the former, but not the latter. It is a basic
truism that insurgency works, but terrorism does not.
—Max Abrahms
Los Angeles, California
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